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Article 8

NOTES
tinues the operation of an instrument dangerous per se, and already

tarnished with disastrous rapacity. With constructive revision of
flaws incidental yet detrimental to the rigidity and strength of such a
statute, the responsibility act is a very desirable law to which future
victims may turn for justice. It might be safe to anticipate a more
or less universal adoption of some kind of automobile financial responsibility laws.
Edward C. Massa.

NOTES
PROCEDURE OF ADOPTION AND THE RIGHTS OF THE ADOPTED CHILD.

-A short explanatory statement seems fit in the discussion of this
subject. Adoption is defined as the act by which relations of paternity
and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not
so related' by nature.1 The word thus is generally. held to cover the
stock situation in which a person takes a stranger as to blood, to rear,
making him his legal heir. In this statement a distinction is drawn
between the act of legitimation, where the parties are, really, though
not legally related.2 A third distinction may also be made, removing
the idea of adoption from the popular concept, illustrated by the case
where the children are foster children merely, without legal status in
the family which cares for and supports them. 3
Adoption, as a formal, or legal practice is known to have been
practiced extensively in the earliest times covered by written history,
by the Egyptians, and by other races having a high level of civilization, as well as by the semi-barbaric ancient Germans.4 Breaux, J., in
Succession of Unforsake,5 cites Merlin as authority for stating that
their ceremony of adoption was performed by military ceremony in a
formal proceeding. Adoption was early kr~own and recognized in the
Civil Law, being treated by Justinian in his Codification, 6 and from
this law the practice became firmly rooted in the legal systems of the
nations of the continent, being carried afield by colonization and
conquest.
The practice of adoption was unknown to the Common Law.7 As
a result of this, in common law jurisdictions the validity of the prac1 Albring v. Ward, 100 N. W. 609 (1904); Morrison v. Sessions, 38 N. W.
249 (1888).
2 Allison v. Bryan, 21 Okla. 557, 17 Ann. Cas. 468 (1908).
3
Crumbley v. Worden, 66 N. E. 318' (I1. 1903).
4 See Succession of Unforsake, 19 So. 602 (La. 1896).

5 Op. cit. supra note 4.
6 See In re Session's Estate, 38 N. W. 249 (Mich. 1888).
7 In re Session's Estate, op. cit. supra note 6; Sarazin v. Union R. Co., 55
S. W. 92 (Mo. 1900); Ex parte Clark, 25 Pac. 967 (Cal. 1891).
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tice and the rights of the parties depend primarily upon statutes
which have been enacted in practically every state. 8 Massachusetts
appears to have been one of the first of the common law jurisdictions
to bring forward such legislation, with its statute of 1851. 9 These
statutes have been held constitutional, the statement being made that
the adopted child does not deprive the adoptive parent of property,
"without due process of law," since there is no deprivation of property,
but merely a direction as to whom it shall descend,' 0 and because the
right to inherit is statutory. A question and a controversy arises as
to the, construction of these statutes. One group of cases holds that
since the whole matter is in derogation of the common law and because the rights involved are serious and far reaching they must be
strictly construed and applied."
The protagonists of liberal construction of these adoption statutes give as the basis for their view, the
reasons that the object of the statutes is to provide care and protection to the children of the state, and since this is a most desirable
and worthy end, the means should be liberally construed, that the end
may be easily attained.' 2 These courts tend to establish a prima facie
presumption that such proceedings are regular, which will stand until
evidence is produced to rebut it. 1 3
It may be said that there are two general methods or procedures
of adoption: (1) By a judicial proceeding; and (2) By agreement,
declaration, or, as it is often said, by deed, because of its similarity
of operation and execution to a deed. It will do no harm to repeat
that this whole matter of adoption is purely statutory, and reference
to the statute of the particular jurisdiction is of primary importance.
Nevertheless it is possible to discuss this subject in a general manner.
In adoption by judicial proceeding the statute usually provides for
a petition to a designated court, which functions as a court, not as a
judicial officer, and which may ask for facts and make a decision upon
them, acting judicially. This court is generally the probate court. Of
course the petition must set out the necessary parties and allegations,
such as abandonment or consent of the natural parent, the residence of
the parties, and the consent of the party to be adopted, but in all
cases this is covered by the statute. Once this petition is before the
court it may ask for the submission of evidence, may cause an investi8 Morse v. Osborne, 77 Atl. 403 (N. H. 1910).
9 Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 I1l. 26 (1881).
10 Sayles v. Christie, 187 Ill. 420, 58 N. E. 480 (1900).

11 Ex parte Clarke, 87 Cal. 638, 25 Pac. 967 (1891).
12 Leonard v. Honisfager, 43 Ind. App. 607, 88 N. E. 91 (1909); Parsons v.
Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N. W. 147 (1898).
18 Jossey v. Brown, 119 Ga. 758, 47 S. E. 350 (1904).
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gation of the parties and any circumstances of the case which it may
deem pertinent, and then with the facts as a basis, it renders the
decree of adoption, or not, as the court sees fit.
An adoption by contract, or written instrument or deed, is not a
judicial proceeding in spite of the fact that the approval of a judicial
officer is involved. This point forces us to note the distinction between
the powers of a court and the powers of a judge of that court. The
same person, as the court, and as the judge of the court, or as a
judicial officer, may have vastly different powers. In a proceeding such
as this the consent or sanction of a judicial officer is necessarily involved, yet the proceeding is in no strict sense judicial, but the act
of the judge is the act of an officer, while the action of the court may
be said to be the act of an institution. This process of adoption is
analogous to the conveyance of real estate in that it requires the execution, acknowledgment and recording of the formal paper. 14 "The
adopted child is the grantee and the thing granted is the irrevocable
right, capacity or qualification to inherit, or succeed to the property
of the adoptive parent in case he should die intestate." 15 This instrument may be a pact between the adopting parent or parents, the
adopted person, and if the adopted person be a minor, the natural
parents of the adopted child, 16 but in, other jurisdictions it needs only
the execution and validation of the adopting party or parties. 17 The
statute of the state of New York makes use of both of these methods,
prescrbing the judicial process for the adoption of children where the
natural parents have hitherto cared for them, and reserving the method
of adoption by deed for the use of those adopting children who are
wards of an institution.
A word as to who may be adopted may not be out of place in view
of at least one recent case. It is generally held that adults may be
adopted and that this proceeding is not confined exclusively to children
or minors. If the statute specifies "minor child" the matter is at an
end. But it has been held that the word "child," as used in the
statute, does not refer to a minority classification, but rather to the
status of that party who is to be adopted.' 8 The right to adopt adults
has even been recognized by the statute of Louisiana.
The rights of the adopted child may extend in several directions.
Naturally the most important from a legal standpoint, and the one
engaged in litigation to the greatest extent is that of inherifance. Of
Clarkson v. Hatton, 44 S. W. 761, 39 L. R. A. 748 (Mo. 1898).
Abney v. De Loach, 84 Ala. 393 (1888).
16 Luppie v. Winans, 37 N. J. Eq. 245 (1883).
17 Clarkson v. Hatton, op. cit. supra note 14.
14

15

18 Sheffield v. Franklin, 151 Ala. 492, 44 So. 373 (1907); Markover v.
Krauss, 132 Ind. 294, 31 N. E. 1047 (1892).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
course there is also the right of the adopted child to look to his foster
parent for support and the necessities of life, and, as a corollary, his
right to bind the parent for such items, this promise being implied
from the fact of adoption.1 There is also the right to the use of the
name of the adopting parent,20 which, though taken as a matter of
course, may become the subject of dispute more than ever today, when
names are valued so highly.
The right of inheritance is comparatively simple under the civil
law, for there the child is the full heir; indeed, by the civil code of
France the child comes under the same rights and privileges as does
a child by birth, even though there are other children, by birth, after
the adoption. 2 1 This settled the possibility of any controversy in so
far as the civil law was concerned. However, since the common law
did not recognize the act of, or the relationship created by, adoption
the right to inherit must depend in the first place on a valid statute
of adoption, fully complied with 22 and, further, on the construction
and interpretation given the statute by the courts. In the vast majority
of the states 23 the interpretation placed upon the statute is to place
the adopted child on the same basis as a child of the direct blood line
in regard to inheritance. This gives us practically the same result as
under the civil law.2 4 Several courts have been more explicit. Thus

in the District of Columbia the adopted child may not inherit from
the adoptive parent, except by will.2 5

In Mississippi the rule is

slightly more relaxed so that the child does not inherit of the adoptive
parent unless so provided by the decree of adoption.26 And in Nebraska the rule has been recently changed so that there is a presumption
that the child does inherit of the adopting parent, and this will operate unless a contrary intention clearly appears.2 7 It is recognized that
the relationship of parent and child is distinct (because of the influence
of the common law) from the right to inherit, whether the child be
adopted or natural; and it is also recognized that the law may and
does in some instances, distinguish between children by adoption and
19

Moncrief v. Ely, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 405 (1838).

Riley v. Day, 88 Kan. 503, 129 Pac. 524 (1913).
In re Nakuapa, 3 Hawaii 342.
In re Carroll, 219 Pa. 440, 68 Atl. 1038 (1908); Coombs v. Cook, 35
Okla. 326, 129 Pac. 698 (1913).
23 Ala., Cal., Conn., Ind., Iowa, Kans., Ky., La., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn.,
Miss., Mo., Nebr., N. H., N. Y., Pa., Ohio, Tenn., Tex., Vt. and Wash.
24
In re Cook, 187 N. Y. 253, 79 N. E. 991 (1907); Jordan v. Abney, 97
Tex. 296, 78 S. W. 486 (1904).
25 Moore v. Hoffman, Fed. Cas. No. 9764a (1854).
26 Beaver v. Crump, 76 Miss. 34, 23 So. 432 (1898).
2"
Ferguson v. Herr, 64 Neb. 649, 90 N. W. 625 (1902), rev'd, 94 N. W.
542 (1903).
.20

21
22
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by birth, and may limit the right of the adopted child to inherit.28
The right of such child to inherit is only an ordinary one and does not
n any way affect the right of the adoptive parent to dispose of his
property, real or personal, by will.2 9 The general effect and interpretation of adoption statutes is to approximate as closely as possible by
artificial means, the relationship of parent and child between adoptive
parent and adopted child.80
We have seen that the majority of the states give the adopted
child the same status as a child of the blood. Where the adopting
parent dies intestate, the result of such statute is to allow the child to
inherit his parents' property.3 ' Under less liberal statutes such sweeping results would not occur. The words of these statutes, such as,
"issue," "living issue," 32 "child," "children," 33have been uniformly
held to include children by adoption. The Massachusetts statute covers
this point, providing that the word, "child," shall include adopted
children unless a contrary intention appears in the instrument. It has
been held that the phrase, "heirs at law," 34 would include adopted
children, while the phrase, "heirs of the body," 35 would not. Where
the child has been adopted under a statute which merely recognized
the relation of parent and child without allowing any inheritance, a
revision of the statute to allow him to inherit, made before the death
of the adoptive parent is binding on him, and gives the child the
right of inheritance.3 6
Where the adoptive parent leaves a will, the courts have been much
more strict and less willing to recognize this unconditional absorption
of the adopted child into the status of descendants of the blood and
these same words used in the statutes and used in the provisions of
a will are subject to differing constructions. Thus under a gift to the
testator's children there is a split of authority, but the majority of
the decisions hold that adopted childen do not ,take as children of the
Calhoun v. Bryant, 28 S. Dak. 266, 123 N. W. 266 (1909).
Burnes v. Burnes, 132 Fed. 485, aff., 137 Fed. 781 (1905); Austin v. Davis,
128 Ind. 472, 26 N. E. 890 (1891); Clark v. West, 96 Tex. 437, 73 S. W. 797
28

29

(1903).
30 Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274 (1884), Chehak v. Battles, 133 Ia. 107,
110 N. W. 330 (1907). But see Taylor v. Deseve, 81 Tex. 246, 16 S. W. 1008

(1891).
31 In re Newman's Estate, 75 Cal. 213, 16 Pac. 887 (1888); Van Matre v.
Sankey, 148 Ill.
536, 36 N. E. 628 (1893); Morrison v. Sessions, 70 Mich. 297,

38 N. W. 249 (1888).
32 Riley v. Day, 88 Kan. 503, 129 Pac. 524 (1913); In re Walworth, 85
Vt. 322, 82, Atl. 7 (1912).
33 Powers v. Hafley, 85 Ky. 671, 4 S. W. 683 (1887)"
34
Gilliam v. Guar. Trust Co., 186 N. Y: 127, 78 N. E. 697 (1906).
35 In re Walworth, op. cit. supra note 32.
36 Sorrenson v. Rasmussen, 114 Minn. 234, 131 N. W. 325 (1911).
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37
nor are adopted children generally
testator under such a provision,
38
Gifts to heirs have generally
permitted to take under gifts to issue.
39
and even when the will is
been held not to include adopted heirs,
made before the death of the testator it includes when making gifts to
classes, those born 40 between making of the will and the death of
41
Again, where
the testator, but not those adopted during this period.
the wife of the testator adopted a child subsequent to the death of
the testator, a provision of his will, of a limitation over to the heirs
42
In Illinois, howat law of his wife, the adopted child was excluded.
ever, the adoption of a child after the making of a will brings it
the estate
within the statute and entitles the child to inherit a share of 43
appears.
disinherit
to
intent
an
unless
heirs
natural
the
with

As to the revocation of a will by the adoption of a child, in those
states where the statute gives the child adopted all the rights of one
born to the parents in wedlock, the holding has been that a prior will
44
But where the mere creation of
was revoked upon the adoption.
the relationship of parent and child is accomplished, and nothing more,
45
this is not true.
The adopted child is also entitled to inherit from his natural
parents, the right to inherit not stopping with one exercise of it, and
46
This right has been
the status of the child not limiting its exercise.
law, which provided
civil
in
the
of
Justinian,
time
the
recognized since
that an adopted son should inherit not only from his natural father
41
This has been carried so far
but also from his adoptive parent.
as to allow the child to inherit from one person in a dual capacity, as
when a grandfather having adopted his two granddaughters, it was
held that they should inherit as his daughters by adoption, and as his
granddaughters through the deceased mother, since the grandfather left
37
Wilder v. Wilder, 116 Me. 389, 102 Atl. 110 (1917) ; Parker v. Carpenter,
77 N. H. 453, 92 Aft. 955 (1915) ; Hughes Estate, 225 Pa. 79, 73 AtI. 1061 (1909).
Contra: Manie v. Gruenewald. 289 Ill. 468, 124 N. E. 605 (1919); Mitchells Will,

157 Wis. 327, 147 N.
38

W. 332 (1914).

Blodget v. Stowell, 189 Ms..s. 142, 75 N. E. 138 (1906).
Morrison v. Sessions, op. cit. supra note 31; Warden v. Overman, 135 N.

31)
W. 649 (Iowa 1912) ; Walcott v. Robinson, 214 Mass. 1172, 100 N. E. 1109 (1913).
40 Goggins v. Flythe, 113 N. Car. 102, 18 S. E. 96 (1893).

41

Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48, 3 So. 900 (1888).

Reinders v. Koppelman, 94 Mo. 338, 7 S. W. 288 (1888).
43 Flannigan v. Howard, 209 I1. 396, 65 N. E. 782 (1902).
44 Hilpire v. Claude, 109 Ia. 159, 80 N. W. 332 (1899); Glascott v. Bragg,
Contra: Davis v. Fogle, 124 Ind. 41, 23 N. E.
111 Wis. 605, 87 N. W. 853 (1901).
42

860 (1860).
45

In re Gregory's Estate, 15 Misc. 407, 37 N. Y. S. 925 (1896).

46 Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N. E. 993 (1897). Unless there
is a statute to the contrary. Wagner v. Varner, 50 Ia. 532 (1879).
47

SANDARS JusmNiAN, 113-120.
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no will. 4 8 Massachusetts adopts a rule which allows inheritance in one
capacity only, the instance being of an adopted grandchild, which was
allowed to inherit as a child only.49 Neither does a second adoption
destroy the right of the child to inherit under the first, if the adoptive
parent of the first adoption has died prior to the second adoption. 50
But where the first adoption has been cancelled no rights arise therefrom to be made use of by the child.5 1 Of course, once the property
is transferred to the adopted child, his heirs, and lineal descendants
succeed him, even though the property was inherited from the adoptive
parents or parent. 52 But this doctrine has been extended so that the
heirs of the adopted child inherit through him a share of the estate
of a deceased adoptive parent as though the child were in the direct
line of the blood.53
However, the right to inherit from the adoptive parent is the extent of the right, and the adopted child may not inherit from the relatives of this parent, and for good reason, since it would not be just
to put it within the province of any person to vary the inheritance of
another person, this person not knowing of, making provision for, or
consenting to, this variation. Judge Lamm, in Hockaday v. Lynn,54
says that, "The adoptive child is let in for the purpose of preserving to
the full its right'of inheritance from the adoptive parent, and the door
to inheritance is shut and the bolt shot at that precise point." This
is a personal relation between the two parties to the adoption and must
not be extended, "5 or the distribution of property might be contrary
to the wishes of the person whose testament it was and who did not
know of the adoption so as to provide for it. A Massachusetts case
states the law succinctly: The adopted child may inherit from his
parent but he may not inherit in lieu of his parent by right of representation, from any of his parents kindred. 56
This treatment bas, of necessity been brief as well as general. The
first authority to consult is the statute of one's own jurisdiction.
Bill R. Desetiberg.
Wagner v. Varner, 50 Ia. 532 (1879).
Delano v. Bruerton, 148 Mass. 619, 20 N. E. 308 (1889); Morgan v.
Reel, 213 Pa. 81, 62 Atl. 253 (1905).
50 Russell's Adm'r. v. Russell's G'd'n., 14 Ky. Lw. Rep. 236 (1892); Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N. E. 993 (1897).
51 Morrison v. Sessions, op. cit. supra note 31.
52 Paul v. Davis, 100 Ind. 422 (1884).
53 Pace v. Klink, 51 Ga. 221 (1874); Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 186
N. Y. 127, 78 N. E. 697 (1906).
54 200 Mo. 456, 98 S. V. 585 (1906).
55 Kettell v. Baxter, 50 Misc. 428, 100 N. Y. S. 529 (1906).
56 Wyeth v. Stone, 144 Mass. 441, 11 N. E. 729, 731 (1887).
48
49

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-CHATTEL MORTGAGE DISTINGUISHED FROM

PLEDGE.-We can understand the scope of a chattel mortgage better

by comparing it with other transactions. A chattel mortgage under the
title theory, differs from a vendor's lien in that a lienor has no title
to the property.' It differs from a sale wherein the title is retained

by the seller until the performance of some condition, in that no title
passes from the debtor to the creditor. The creditor merely retains a
title which the debtor never had. - A chattel mortgage differs from a
sale with a right to repurchase in that the latter transaction is no a
security for an obligation. It differs from an assignment for the benefit
of creditors, which is not a security, but implies an absolute appropriation of the property to the payment of the indebtedness.
A chattel mortgage, under the common law theory, is a sale of personal property on a condition subsequent, upon the performance of
which the title reverts to the mortgagor, and upon the breach of which
the mortgagee's title becomes absolute. Some jurisdictions, either by
statutory enactments or decisions, regard a chattel mortgage as constituting a security only and as creating only a lien on the subject
matter.2 In some states that follow the lien theory the title is not
regarded as passing under a chattel mortgage until after foreclosure
and sale; 3 while in other jurisdictions the mortgagee, after a breach
of condition, is regarded as having become vested with a special property right in the subject-matter of the mortgage. 4 Other courts hold
that while the general property is regarded as passing to the mortgagee,
there is a statutory right of redemption in the mortgagor existing
1 Metcalfe v. Fosdich, 23 Ohio St. 114 (1877) (A leased his real estate with
certain fixtures and machinery reserving in the deed of lease a "lien" upon the
premises and property for the purchase money and rents but with liberty to the
lessee to remove at his pleasure any portion of the machinery upon the condition that he should at time of removal substitute others equally as good. Held,
reservation of lien was not in legal effect a chattel mortgage upon the movable
parts of the machinery.); Gushee v. Robinson, 40 Md. 412 (1885).
2 Lucas v. Campbell, 88 Ill. 447 (1878) (Debt is the principal thing, and
the mortgage is a mere incident attached to the thing which has no separate and
determinate value; whatever discharges the debt eo istanti extin-uishes the mortgage.). See JoNss oN CHATTE MORTGAGES, § 503; State v. Lepkin, 62 N. J.
Law 580, 41 Aft. 712. (1898).
3 Marsh v. Wade, 20 Wash. 578, 20 Pac. 578 (1899) (Where §§ 1986-1999
of the WAsH. CoDE treat a chattel mortgage as a mere security under which no
title can possibly pass except by foreclosure and sale.)
4 J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Campbell, 13 Pac. 324 (Or. 1887)
(An assignee for the benefit of creditors, of property covered by a chattel
mortgage, receives it subject to the rights of the mortgagee. If he disposes of it
absolutely without an attempt to redeem it, he is liable to the mortgagee in an
action for conversion). See Jowxs oN CiiATTrL MOTAGE, chap. 10, par. 701.

NOTES
until there has been a foreclosure in accordance with the statute
which vests a legal5 right in the mortgagor limiting the right and title
of the mortgagee.
A pledge is a bailment of personal property securing some debt
or obligation." But the word "pledge" is commonly used, as Sir William Jones defines it, "As a bailment of goods by a debtor to his
creditor to be kept until the debt is discharged." 7 The pledgee secures his debt by the bailment and the pledgor obtains credit or other
advantages. At common law, the words "pledge" and "pawn" were
synonymous but in modem usage "pawn" generally indicates the
pledging of goods with a pawnbroker. "Hypothecation" is a special
form of. pledge wherein the possession remains in the debtor.8
The Federal courts, in stating the difference between a chattel
mortgage and a pledge, hold that a chattel mortgage imports a present
conveyance of a legal title subject to a defeasance upon performance
of an express condition subsequent contained either in the same or in
a different instrument. It may or may not be accompanied with
delivery of possession. On the other hand, where the title to the property is not presently transferred, but possession only is given with power
to sell upon default in the performance of conditions, the transaction
is a pledge and not a mortgage. 9
The general distinction is that, in a chattel mortgage under the
title theory, the title is conveyed with a condition rendering the conveyance void on the payment of a certain sum of money on or before
a day agreed upon; while in a pledge, the goods bailed are deposited
as a collateral security, and only a special property is transferred to
the bailee, the general title in the meantime remaining with the bailor.
The difference has also been well stated thus.: "'A mortgage
(chattel) is a pledge and more; it is an absolute pledge to become an
absolute interest if not redeemed at a certain time. A pledge is a
5 Weeks v. Baker, 152 Mass. 20 (1890) (A mortgagor of personal property
upon a tender of payment by him, under the PuB. STs. c. 192, par. 6, and a non
return of property, may maintain replevin therefor without bringing the money
into court.).
6 Bank v. Capital Saving's Bank & Trust Co., 77 Vt. 123, 59 AtI. 197, 107
Am. St. Rep. 754 (1904); Wetherel v. Johnson, 208 fI. 247, 70 N. E. 229
(1904); Davis v. Davis, 88 Ga. 191, 14 S. E. 194 (1891); Wilkinson v. Mesner,
158 Mo. App. 551, 13 S. W. 931 (1911); Tennent v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co.,
133 Mo. App. 345, 112 S. W. 754 (1908); Austin v. Hayden, 171 Mich. 38, 137
N. W. 317 (1912).
JONES ON BAILnvTs, p. 117.
8 Cycr~oPEDic LAW Drcr., 775; 2 WoRns & PHRmASEs (Second Series) p. 926
7

(1914).
9

Dale v. Patterson, 234 U. S. 399, 34 Sup. Ct. 785, 58 Law Ed. 1370, 52

L. R. A. (N. S.) 254 (1914).
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deposit of personal property not to be taken back but on the payment
of a certain sum by express stipulation or by the course of trade to be
a lien upon them.'" '0
A chattel mortgage, under the common law theory, is a present
transfer of title to mortgaged property with a defeasance, so that upon
payment of a debt or the performance of the obligation secured, the
title reverts to the property. A pledge, on the other hand, is a transfer
of possession of personalty, not the title, as security for the performance
of some act by the pledgor with provisions for the sale of the property
or other disposition thereof by the pledgee upon the pledgor's default."
In a chattel mortgage, according to the common law theory, the
whole legal title passes conditionally to the mortgagee, and if the goods
are not redeemed at the time stipulated, the title becomes absolute at
law although equity will interpose to compel a redemption. But after
default in the payment of a pledge, the property deposited does not
belong to the pledgee; he cannot appropriate it to himself and his only
12
power is that of sale, through which he must realize his debt.
A mortgage of personal property is good between the parties when
the mortgagor retains possession. This is not true in the case of &
pledge. All the authorities agree that to constitute a pledge there must
be an actual delivery of possession to the pledgee and to preserve
13
this pledge he must retain possession.
10

11 C. J. 403, note 24.
11 Palmer v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 114 Minn. 1, 130 N. W. 250,
Ann. Cas. 1912 B, p. 957 (1911) (Where holder of a paid-up life policy delivered possession to the insurer as security for the payment of a loan, with
authority to the insurer to appropriate the policy to its own use by cancellation
on insured's default, transaction was not a chattel mortgage. Also, parties to
a contract of pledge may, by agreement, provide the manner and method for the
enforcement of the same, provided the method agreed upon be not. in violation
of law.). For other cases see: "Pledges," CENT. DIG. § 129, DEC. DIG. § 53.
Also, see 2 WORDS & PHRASES, pp. 1098-1106.
12 Ottumwa Nat. Bank v. .Totter, 89 S. W. 65 (Mo. 1905).
13 Raper v. Harrison, 15 Pac. 219 (Kan. 1887); Willard v. Monarch Elevator
Co., 87 N. W. 225 (N. D. 1901) (Plaintiff leased a cultivated farm to one
Jepson for a season under a written lease, "The second party to hold 500 bu.
of first party's one-half of wheat until the plowing is done, and shall be a lien
on the same for that amount; the ticket for the above 500 bu. to be deposited
with Sherman." Held, that such proviso is a chattel mortgage, and not. a
pledge, nor an agreement for a pledge so far as the wheat is concerned.); Commercial and Savings Bank of San Jose v. Hornberger, 73 Pac. 625 (Cal. 1903);
Wilson v. Little, 2 N. Y. (2 Comstock) 443 (1849); Ward v. Sumner, 5
Pick. (Mass.) 59 (1827) (A having indorsed for B certain promissory notes,
B before the notes became due, executes a deed of his furniture to A, upon
condition to be void if B pays the note. The deed and furniture are formally
delivered in the presence of a witness, to whom alone the transaction is made
known, but B remains in the possession and use of the furniture as before.
Held, that the conveyance might be viewed either as a mortgage or a pledge,

NOTES
Under the recording statutes an unrecorded mortgage is not good
as to third persons unless accompanied by a delivery of the mortgaged
chattel. Under these circumstances there is no difference between a
chattel mortgage and a pledge. In an Arkansas case, the court said:
"The transaction constitutes a verbal mortgage though possession of
'the property remains in the mortgagee there is no distinction between
a mortgage and a pledge." 14 Possession is evidence of ownership and
it is for this reason the delivery of possession of personal property
to the mortgagee has been universally held to validate an unrecorded
mortgage and to be an effectual substitute for its record. The change
of possession, however, which may have this effect must be of a character to accomplish the full purpose of the recording act. It must
be designed to give notice of the claim of the mortgagee as open and
as effectual as a record of the mortgage. The possession of the chattel
must be open, public and actual so that the creditor or purchaser
who undertakes to deal with the property would be likely to receive
notice of the possession of the mortgage. Where the change in possession is doubtful due t6 a symbolical delivery of articles of a bulky nature, the transaction will be resolved in favor of the purchaser. The case
of Lee Wilson & Co. v.'Crittenden County Bank & Trust C&.15 shows
that where there is an insufficient delivery of personal property, the
courts will not treat the transaction as an oral mortgage or a pledge.
A manufacturer of lumber stacked in piles on land which had been
leased by him sold the lumber and leased the ground. The buyer gave
a draft and a note for the price. A bank purchased them and it was
agreed that the lumber should be pledged to the bank. There was no
actual change of the location of the lumber nor any marks to indicate
according to the intent of the parties, and as the furniture remained in B's hand,
it must be construed to be a mortgage: and there being no actual fraud, the
mortgage was held valid as against creditors of B.)
14 Wilson & Co. v. Crittenden County Bank & Trust, 98 Ark. 379, 135 S. W.
885 (1911). See "Chattel Mortgages," CENT. DiG. §§ 417-425, DEc. DiG. § 191;
Casey v. Cavoroc, 96 U. S. 467, 24 L. Ed. 779 (1877) (Possession is the essence
of a pledge; and without it, no privilege can exist as against third persons);
Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo. App. 352, 8 L. R. A. 147 (1890) (The delivery, as
collateral security, of a bill of sale, copies of gauger's returns and warehouse
receipts of whiskey held in the United States bonded warehouse, creates a pledge
and not a chattel mortgage); Thurber v. Oliver, 26 Fed. 224 (1892) (Mere delivery on deposit of goods as security is not a mortgage df them but a pledge);
Garlich v. James, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 146, 7 Am. Dec. 294 (1825) (Delivery by
payee of a -note unindorsed as security is a pledge and not a mortgage).
15 135 S. W. 885 (Ark. 1911). See: Strahorn-Hutton-Evans Commission
Co. v. Quigg, 97 Fed. ,735 (1899) (Where mortgaged personal property is in the
possession of the bailee of the mortgagor, notice to him is indispensable to a
delivery of the possession to the mortgaget that will be effectual against creditors
and purchasers); JONES ON CHATTE. MORTGAGES, p. 186; Lanfear v. Sumner,
17 Mass. 110 (1821).
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the change in possession. It was agreed that the manufacturer should
hold possession for the bank to secure payment of the draft and
note. Held, there was no sufficient delivery to the bank construing
the transaction to amount to an oral mortgage or a pledge as against
a subsequent purchaser.
The case of Grand Ave. Bank v.St. Louis Union Trust Co. 16 shows
that the pledgee, though he has no actual possession of the property,
can protect his rights by exercising control over the pledged property.
Here a piano dealer obtained a loan from a bank on the agreement
that it was to be secured by a pledge of pianos in a storage room.
The storage room was apart from the sales room. When the loan was
made the cashier of the bank took the make of each piano and checked
them off on a storage receipt which had been delivered to him. A piano
repairer who was employed by the dealer worked in the end of the
storage room. The repairer was informed that the cashier had come
to take possession for the bank and was placed in charge by him. A
few days later the president of the bank went to the storage room,
looked over the pianos, and told the repairer that they were the property of the bank, showing him the receipt and he said that he understood that he was taking care of them for the bank. Held, that as
against the assignee for the benefit of the creditors of the dealer, possession had been delivered to the bank and retained by it, notwithstanding the repairer was an employee of the dealer so as to create
a valid pledge.
Whether a transaction shall be treated as having the characteristics
af one form of security rather than the other often must rest on the
intention and conduct of the parties.17 This intention or conduct is
ascertained from the whole instrument evidencing the transaction and
not from particular words therein. Thus the fact that the word "pledge"
is employed in an instrument evidencing a transaction does not conclusively determine the character, but the rule is that even where this
word is used, if it appears that it is the clear intent of the parties that
the possession of the subject matter is to remain in the debtor and
the possession so remains, the transaction will be held to be a chattel
mortgage.
18

115 S. W. 1071 (Mo. 1909).

17 Gamson v.Pritchard, 96 N. E. 715 (Mass. 1911) (Where, though the
bill of parcels named plaintiff as buyer, it contained no condition of defeasance
or provision that he should hold title as collateral security for the money furnished by him to purchase the goods, the transaction did not on its face amount
to a chattel mortgage in favor of the plaintiff); Shaw v. Silloway, 145 Mass.
503, 14 N. E. 783 (1888); Copeland v. Barnes, 147 Mass. 388, 18 N. E. 65
(1888); Thompson v. Dolliver, 132 Mass. 103 (1882); Ward v. Sumner, 5 Pick.
(Mass.) 59 (1827) ; Willard v. Monarch Elevator Co., 10 N. D. 400, 87 N. W. 996
(1901); Parrish v. Mahany, 12 S. D. 278, 81 N. W. 295, 76 Am. St. Rep. 604
(1901).
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It is quite easy to recognize the distinction between a chattel mortgage and a pledge where goods are held as security for a debt or for
the performance of an act. In the case of a pledge title remains in
the pledgor. The pledgee gets only a special property right. In the
case of a chattel mortgage, title usually passes from the mortgagor to
the mortgagee. 18 But this distinction is not easily apprehended when
there is a transfer of possession of a written instrument, such as a
note, bond, or a warehouse receipt. The fact that title passes in a note
or a bond does not necessarily create a mortgage.' 9 To constitute a
mortgage title must pass, but it is not in all cases a mortgage because
title has been conveyed. A transfer of stock may be absolute but still
if its object is qualified by a contemporaneous paper and declares it
to be a deposit of the stock as collateral security for the payment of
a loan, the transaction will be regarded as a pledge. When title to a
written instrument is transferred for the security of a debt or the
performance of an act it is a question of intention whether the apparent transfer of title would operate as a mortgage or as a pledge.
In the absence of proof of intention, the transaction is presumed to
18 Thomas v. Couthard, 3 Dana (Ky.) 475, 26 Am. Dec. 475 (1834)
(Where an instrument states that debtor pledged, hypothecated and mortgaged
his interest in a steamboat but contains no words of conveyance, it creates a
pledge).
19 Gay v. Moss, 34 Cal. 125 (1867) (Assignment of a bond and a mortgage, although absolute on its face but accompanied by a promissory note made
by the assignor which gives the assignee authority to sell the bond and mortgage
on default is a pledge of the bond and mortgage and not a sale of them. The
assignment and delivery are necessary to give the pledgee the full authority
to readily control it and afford a prompt means of making the pledge available.
For these reasons, the fact that the title passes in form by the assignment., in
case of a chose in action, does not necessarily make it a mortgage); Daley v.
Spiller, 222 Ill. 421, 78 N. E. 782 (1906) (Holder of a life policy, gave one who
loaned him money, a note for the amount of the loan, and an absolute conveyance of the policy, and an assignment with a defeasance, by the terms of
which insured was entitled to have the policy re-assigned to him on payment
of the note when due. Held, that the instruments showed that the policy was
pledged; and not sold to the lender); Dewey v. Bowman, 8 Cal. 145 (1856)
(Assignment of a lease as security for a note is a pledge. The pledgee does
n 6 t take legal title by the assignment, or by failure of the pledgor to pay
the note; but he has the right to collect the rents, and apply them on the
note, also being responsible for the surplus); Dycher v. Allen, 7 Hill (N. Y.)
497, 42 Am. Dec. 87 (1844); Wilson v. Little, 2 N. Y. 443, 51 Am. Dec. 307
(1849) (Deposit constitutes a pledge where the instrument is in the usual
form of a note followed by the statement that certain bonds, stocks, etc., are
deposited with the. creditor as collateral security); Mechanics Bldg. Assn. v.
Conover, 14 N. J. Eq. 219 (1862) (Transfer by members of partially paid
building association stock to the association as security is a.pledge) ; Irving Park
Assn. v. Watson, 41 Or. 95, 67 Pac. 945 (1887) (Assignment and transfer of
shares of stock in a corporation by a debtor as security for a debt is a pledge
and not a mortgage).
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be a pledge instead of a mortgage. But where the assignment of a
note and a mortgage is made in the form of a mortgage and contains
some kind of a defeasance, the transaction is regarded as aLmortgage.
Often a constructive delivery of a chattel transfers title. For example,
the assignment of a bill of lading, of a mortgage of a policy of insurance, or of any chose in action as security, may be either a pledge
or a mortgage according to the intent' of the parties. It is often
important to know whether a transaction is a pledge or a chattel
mortgage. The legal effect of each is different. In case of default in
a mortgage title become absolute in the mortgagee and he may either
deal with the property as his own and a tender by the debtor of the
amount of the debt secured does not revest title in him or give him
any legal right to recover the property, although he may have an
equitable right of redemption. In case of a default by a pledgor, the
general property is still in the pledgor. He can recover the specific
chattel if he pays his debt. If the pledgor tenders and the pledgee
refuses to return the chattel, the debtor has an action for damages
for its detention. Because of this difference, courts have sometimes
in case of doubt, leaned towards regarding a transaction a pledge rather
than a mortgage. For this reason contracts, doubtful in terms, have
sometimes been construed as mortgages and sometimes as pledges,
according as the court has deemed that the intention of the parties
would be best effectuated and the purposes of justice best subserved.
"An instrument which is in the form of a mortgage, or on its face
called a mortgage, cannot be shown by parol evidence to have been
intended to constitute a mere pledge or something other than a mort20
gage."
John M. Ruberto
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JONES ON CHATTEL- MORTGAGES

(4th ed. 1894)
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THE FOLLOWING TRANSACTIONS WERE HUD TO BE "MORTGAGES:

Where chattels were delivered as security under. an agreement to return them
if the creditors should be reimbursed for advances and the transaction was held to
constitute a mortgage.: May v. Eastin, 2 Port. (Ala.) 414 (1831).
Where the legal title was transferred to a note with power to collect and
a provision for accounting any surplus over the amount secured: Wright v.
Ross, 36 Cal. 414 (1868).

Where instrument reads, "I hereby agree to give up all claims due to you
from me . . . are not paid by a day specified": Bunacleugh v. Poolman, 3 Daly
(N. Y.) 236 (1842).

Where an instrument gave security on a chattel and provided for sale in
case of default although the words used were, "I hereby pledge and give a
lien on": Langdon v. Bull, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) (1833).

NOTES
PLEADING-JOINDER

OF

CAUSES

OF

ACTION.-In discussing the

foundation and. function of common law pleading, Mr. Clark observes
that "The common law writ system was as well known, really a corollary, or perhaps an embodiment, of the substantive law of the time.
There was no right without a writ. The pleadings, therefore, worked
out in advance of the trial the law of the case. . . . The procedural
reform of the nineteenth century was a reaction against this harsh
system. For it was substituted the pleading of the facts. . . . Pleading was to be relegated to the position of an aid to the administration
of justicei instead of being an end in itself." 1
Generally, pleadings are defined by the codes as."the formal allegations by the parties of their respective claims and defenses, for the
judgment of the court." 2 In other words, a statement of the facts
upon which the claim or defense is based, which, in a sense, form a
conduit through which the jurisdiction of the court flows over the
subject-matter.
The effect thus obtained is inconsistent with the
common law system of pleading, wherein this flow was directed
toward a writ, and the codes, in providing this change, have, in effect,
expressly provided within themselves the only source of authority for
pleading. So we must look to the code provisions themselves and the
interpretation of them is the problem presented.
The state of New York was the leader in the reform movement
in the United States and other states adopting this new system of
procedure have substantially embodied the New York provisions
which we will adopt as our model here. The most noticeable difference appearing in the codes is in the arrangement of classes according
to their subject-matter, varying in number from twelve in New York to
three in Colorado.
The main section of the New York code reads as follows: "The
plaintiff may unite in the same complaint two or more causes of
action, whether they are such as were formerly denominated legal or
equitable, or both, where they are brought to recover as follows..." 3
At first blush this seems to present no subtle problem. It is thoroughly consistent with the purpose of the codifiers to abolish the formal
distinctions between law and equity and henceforth have but one
form, a "civil action." Under the common law it was not possible to
seek legal and equitable relief from the same court, so of course it
could not be sought in a single declaration. Those actions that could
be joined in the common law declaration arose out of a kind of legal
similarity of claim, based upon the same writ or form of action,
1 Comment (1925)
2
3

35 YALE L. J. 85, 88, 89.

1 BANCROFT'S CODE PLEADING (1926) § 1.
NEW YORK CODE CIV. PRO. (1920) § 484.
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rather than an unity of occurrence or events relied upon. 4 It has ever
been the desire of equity to bring about a complete adjudication in a
single suit and all matters closely related were allowed to be submitted. So with the intervention of the code, merging these .two
systems into one and dispensing with the common law forms of action
for the "civil action," it is not surprising to find the rules of both
former systems combined therein. Had the codification gone no
further the equitable effect would no doubt have overshadowed the
legal effect to such an extent as to place discretionary jurisdiction in
all courts; for the old legal forms were no more and this obstacle
to converging all the circumstances of a particular subject-matter for
adjudication in a single suit would not confront the judge. This
result would seem to be what was originally sought and the reason
for breaking away from the old restrictions. At least it is the logical
result and some of the states have reached it, or practically so, for
in Kansas we find a statute to this effect: "The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same petition, whether they be such as have
heretofore been denominated legal or equitable or both. . .

."

And

this stands without restrictions depending upon character or subjectmatter of the causes of action. 5 The Iowa code provides that: "Causes
of action of whatever kind, where each may be prosecuted by the
same kind of proceedings.

.

." regardless of legal or equitable nature,

have no restrictions as to the joinder except as to parties and venue. 6
Then in Michigan, "The plaintiff may join in one action, at law or in
equity, as may causes of action as he may have against the defendant,
but legal and equitable causes of action shall not be joined. . .

."

7

And by an amendment to its code Wisconsin abolished classification
and framed the code to read as that in Kansas.8 In concluding an
article on this subject, Mr. Sunderland remarks: "Accordingly, in
default of any rational bases for a system of rules on joinder relating
to the form, nature or subject-matter of actions, we reach the final
stage of development, where it is frankly admitted that the common
law created imaginary difficulties in joining actions, that the code
continued them with substantial but illogical variations, that all a priori
restrictions fail to meet the needs of practical litigation, and that only
by allowing an unlimited freedom of joinder can the maximum of
convenience in the trial of actions be attained." 9 However, the legislators in New York evidently deemed some kind of limitation necessary and seven classes of suits were named in which joinder might be
4
5

CLARK ON CODE PLEADING (1928)

295.

GEN. STATUTES

§ 6979.

OF KAN.

(1915)

6 CODE OF IOWA (1927) § 10960.
7 3 Comp. LAWS OF MIcH. (1915), c. 8, § 12309.
8 1 W3s. STAT. (1929) c. 263, § 263.04.
9

Sunderland, Joinder of Actions, 18 MIcH. L. REv. (1920)

571, 581, S82.
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had. Not deeming the effect adequate another provision was added
in 1852, the most famous of all, commonly known as the "same
transaction" provision. As the code stands today it is composed of
12 sub-sections:
"1. Upon Contract, express or implied.
"2. For personal injuries, except libel, slander, criminal conversation
or seduction.
"3. For libel or slander.
"4. For injuries to real property.
"5. Real property, in ejectment, with or without damages for the
withholding thereof.
"6. For injuries to personal property.
"7. Chattels, with or without damages for the taking or detentionthereof.
"8. Upon .claims against a trustee, by virtue of a contract, or by
operation of law.
"9. Upon claims arising out of the same transaction, or transactions
connected with the same subject of action, and not included within
one of the foregoing subdivisions of this section.
"10. For penalties incurred under the forest, fish and game law.
"11. For penalties incurred under the agricultural law.
"12. For penalties incurred under the public health law." 10
It is interesting to note Mr. Clark's observations upon as much
of the subject as we have now encountered: "The joinder rule is that
separate causes of actioi cannot be 'joined' or pleaded in the same
suit unless they fall within one of the classes of permissible joinder
specified in the codes. .

..

Each rule is at least based on common

sense, though applications of each may at times seem questionable.
As the terms in which they are stated indicate, their application in
particular cases will depend upon the meaning given to the term
'cause of action,' or group of operative facts giving occasion for jurisdiction." 11 Let us make clear at the outset, having confronted the first
problem, that the provision has not the effect of merging various or
several causes of action into a single cause of action, but it permits
several causes of action to be joined in the same petition or complaint,
so long as they are authorized by one of the above subdivisions.
Cases involving" two or more causes of action clearly within one
of the foregoing subdivisions present no serious question of permissibility of joinder,1 2 but where this distinction is not clear the adjudications have been widely divergent and have led to great confusion.,
10 Op. cit. supra note 3,
11 CLARK, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 293.
12 BANCROFr, op. cit. supra note 2, at pp. 20S-6 notes 15 and 16 and cases

cited.
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so much so that a few states have deemed it expedient, as we have
seen, to dispense with all the restrictive sub-sections by expunging.
them from their code provisions,' 3 and some have gone a considerable
distance in this direction through court interpretation. 14 This problem
centers around sub-section 9, of the New York code, for dearly if the
auses of action upon which the plaintiff bases his claim are not within
one of the other sub-divisions, or there is doubt about it, and he
wishes to join them in a single complaint or petition, he will seek to
bring them within either phase of this sub-division, it being the most
equitable of the group. Let us then immediately consider what we
are to understand by

"...

causes of action ...

brought to recover...

upon claims arising out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action, and not included within one
of the foregoing sub-divisions of this section." The ambiguity of this
sub-division arises because of the inaccuracy of interpretation of the
following terms: "Causes of action"; "claims"; "transaction" and
"subject of action." We will consider them in order.
Though "cause of action" has never been crystalized into a definite meaning applicable to all circumstances and practically defies
definition, it has, nevertheless, been described countless times and
seems to be inevitably associated with a right or rights claimed by
the plaintiff which have been violated by the defendant, and plaintiff
seeks to redress such violation in law or equity or both. Thus far the
authorities are fairly agreed. For example: "A cause of action cannot exist without the concurrence of a right, a duty and a default;
or, stated differently, an obligation must exist upon one party in favor
of the other, the performance of which is refused." 15 Another: A
"'cause of action is the right claimed or the wrong suffered by the
plaintiff on the one hand and the duty or delict of the defendant on
the other.'" 16 So in determining if a cause of an action is presented
we look first for a right or rights existing in the plaintiff, then a
wrongful act in violation of this right or rights upon the part of the
defendant, and if there be more than one right there will be more
than one cause of action and plaintiff must adhere to the code provisions under consideration to join them in a single action. It may be
well to note here the conclusion of Chief Justice Winslow, of the WisIs Op. cit. supra notes 5, 6, 7 and 8.
14 Infra notes 17, 23 and 24.
15 Bruner v. Martin, 76 Kan. F66, 93 Pac. 165, 14 L. R. A.
(1907).
16 Breman Mining & Mill Co. v. Brennan, 79 Pac. 806, 812
also: Excelsior Clay Works v. De Camp, 40 Ind. App. 26, 80 N. E.
McKee v. Rebecca A. Dodd, 152 Cal. 637, 93 Pac. 854 (1908); Doyle
Pac. Co., 56 Or. 495, 108 Pac. 201 (1910).

(N. S.) 775
(1905). See
981 (1907);
v. Southern
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consin supreme court, in the case of McArthur v. Moffet et al: 17
"There seems no logical escape from the conclusion that the term
'cause of action' must include the facts showing (1) the plaintiff's
right; (2) the defendant's corresponding duty; and (3) the defendant's breach of that duty, or, to put it more tersely, the plaintiff's
right and its violation by the defendant."
This brings us to a consideration of the term "claims" which would
seem to admit of the interpretation that plaintiff's "claims" are his
assertions demanding redress for a.violation of his right or rights, his
"cause or causes of action." Directly in point we find the following in
Bancroft's Code Pleading: "It is a rule among many of the codes that
causes of action may be united in the same complaint when they arise
out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same
subject of action. This code provision is most comprehensive in
character, and, except where otherwise limited by statute, allows the
joinder of causes, whether legal or equitable, or both; and ex contractu
or ex delicto, or both." 18
It is to be noted that "claims" and
"causes of action" are herein used synonymously. This full statement is
set out to bring before the reader the extension of "claims" in this
respect to include legal claims and equitable claims, tort claims and
contract claims.1 9
The term "transaction" is next before us. It is defined in Pomeroy's
Code Remedies as follows: "A negotiation, or a proceeding, or a conduct of business, between the parties of such a nature that it produces
as necessary results a primary right or rights in favor of the plaintiff
and wrongs done by the defendant which are violations of such right
or rights." 20 The supreme court of Connecticut has defined it thus:
"A transaction is something which has taken place whereby a cause
of action has arisen. It must . ; . consist of an act or agreement or
several acts or agreements having some connection with each other in
which more than one person is concerned and by which the legal relations of such persons between themselves is (are) altered." 21 In
Emerson v. Nash 22 the supreme court of Wisconsin arrived at this
interpretation: "Any event in which two or more persons are actors
involving a right which may.presently, or by what may proximately
occur in respect thereto, be violated, creating a redressable wrong, is
a transaction within the meaning of the statute." The supreme court
17

128 N. W. 445, 447 (Wis. 1910).
BANCRoFT, op. cit. supra note 2 at § 104.
See also: Eagan v. N. Y. Trans. Co., 30 Misc. Rep. 111, 78 N. Y. S.
209 (1902).
18
10

20
21

POMERORY'S CODE RE

EDIES (4th

ed.)
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Craft Refrigerator Co. v. Quipnipiac Brewing Co.. 63 Conn. 551, 29 At].
76 (1894).
22 124 Wis. 369, 389, 102 N. W. 921, 928 (1905).
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of Kansas gives us this succinct statement: "The word 'transactions'
*.. probably means whatever may be done by one person which
affects another's rights, and out of which a cause of action may
arise." 23 The ensuing quotation is of great interest for the new element
it presents that "transaction" should undergo a change of meaning
between its use in the first and second phases of the sub-section, it is
from the supreme court of Oklahoma: "It must be observed, however,
that the term has two distinct meanings in law; that it is used
for two distinct purposes: One, when used as expressive of an
entire scheme, system, project, or business deal; the other, when
used to encompass the acts, and only such -acts, or groups of acts
at, constitute a cause of action. All the connected or dependent acts
which constitute one entire system or deal may properly be referred
to as a 'transaction' in one sense of the term, in the sense it is used in
the first clause of the statutes, and yet within that one transaction
may be several acts, or groups of acts, which constitute a cause of
action, and each such act or group of acts may properly be referred
to as a 'transaction' in the other sense of the term, in the sense it is
used in the second clause of the statute." 24 Though the writer cannot
concur with the foregoing construction of the term "transaction" and
its division into two different meanings, undeniably it has been of
great worth in breaking down the narrow bounds of the sub-section as
frequently construed in cases before this decision. It has introduced
with some firmness the idea that "transaction" need not give rise to a
cause of action, but may give rise to it. A survey of this and the other
definitions would at first seem to confuse rather than clarify the
situation, but when broken down to essentials they divulge several common elements; first, and most important, a "transaction" does or may
give rise to a cause of action; second, they all involve two or more
parties; and third, there must be an occurrence involving these parties,
though what amounts 'to an occurrence is not the same in all the definitions; for example, the Wisconsin case states "two or more persons
are actors"; Mr. Pomeroy would have "A negotiation, or a proceeding
or a conduct of business, between the parties"; the Connecticut case:
"in which more than one person is concerned"; and finally the Kansas
case: "whatever may be done by one party which affects another person's rights." Clearly the first quotation requires more than do the
others, it would mean the parties would have to be physically present
to the "transaction" and be taking an active part therein, yet this
meaning was certainly not adopted by the subsequent Wisconsin case
of McArthur v. Moffet, 25 which attempted to explain the rule to fit an
23
24
25

Scarborough v. Smith, 18 Kan. 399, 406 (1877).
Stone v. Case, 124 Pac. 960, 965 (Okla. 1912).
Op. cit. supra note 17 at p. 448.
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interpretation which it clearly does not allow. It is thus: "If the act
of one person wrongfully involves or infringes upon the right of
another, there is undoubtedly a 'transaction,' though the injured
party be not physically present.
He may, in such case, truly be
called a participant in the act because he.is represented by his right
which is invaded or violated by his adversary's act."
By what
stretch of logic this conclusion was reached we venture no opinion, for
it is obvious that one whose right is violated, especially in his absence,
is being acted upon and not active, hence passive. However, we may
concur with the result reached by this court and disregard the reasoning, for we find it holding in accord with the other interpretations. Mr.
Pomeroy supports the decision found objectionable here for in explaining his definition of "transaction," in his work on Remedies and
Remedial Rights, he states: "Transaction implies mutuality, something
done by both in concert, in which each takes some part." 2 6 It may
be noted however, that the word "proceeding" is interposed in his
definition. Its meaning could create a distinction for it appears with
two other words that imply the mutuality, Mr. Pomeroy speaks of, but
"proceeding," the performance of an act, would not imply this, of itself,
as would the other two, it depends upon whether the phrase "between
the parties" was purposely supplied to overcome the lack of implication
of "mutuality" in this term, or whether it was merely an appendage because of the implication given by the other words. The eagerness to
bring about a broader interpretation springs from a desire to permit
the joinder of such a case as is here hypothetically set out: A is the
owner in fee of Blackacre situated in the state of New York; A is,
and for the past two years has been, living in the state of Indiana.
During A's absence from New York, B has gone upon Blackacre. as
an adverse possessor, and has cut down valuable fruit trees.
A returns and seeks to eject B and recover damages for injury to the real
estate. Now the pertinent sub-sections of the code are 4 (injuries to
real property) and 5 (for ejectment). It is obvious that the two causes
of action cannot be joined unless they can be brought within sub-section 9. If Mr. Pomeroy's definition of "transaction" is to apply, the
writer fails to see how this may be brought about as there has been
no "mutuality" "between the parties,"--hence these transgressions
would fail to come within the scope of "transactions." According to
the other definitions, or at least the interpretations put upon them,
there would be no serious question as to the application of "transaction" to A's claim.
In view of the attitude of the courts in extending the scope of the
term "claims" to include law, equity, tort and contract, it is only reasonable to allow that "transaction" should be at least co-extensive to
26
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admit of the relations, two or more, between the parties which can
come within the alloted field. If so, "transaction" must not be limited
by "mutuality," it must not Tequire the plaintiff to be asserting his
rights and the defendant to interfere with these assertions by a violation of them, it should be enough that the defendant transgress the
plaintiff's rights, even though they are dormant at the time, in such a
manner as may evolve into a cause of action. Then we can admit of
a transaction occurring in the absence of the plaintiff, or arising out of
an accidental tort.
Our next topic is the "subject of action," particularly as it is used
in the second clause of the code "transactions connected with the same
subject of action." An examination of cases in which this problem
has presented an issue leads one into a maze of varied assertions
relative to general interpretation and a skillful avoidance of definition,
backed by many remarks as to the intention of the legislators, which
one is apt to conclude is a matter even as mysterious as the terms
they compiled into this sub-section. In speaking of this amendment
to the code, Judge Comstock remarked in 1858: "Its language is, I
think, well chosen for the purpose intended, because it is so obscure
and so general as to justify the interpretations which shall be found
most convenient and best calculated to promote the ends of justice.
It is certainly impossible to extract from a provision so loose and so
general as to justify the interpretations which shall be found most
convenient and best calculated to promote the ends of justice. It is
certainly impossible to extract from a provision so loose and yet so
comprehensive any rules less liberal than those which have long prevailed in courts of equity." 27 In 1875 Chief Justice Church, of the
New York Court of Appeals, said: "This language is very general and
very indefinite. I have examined the various authorities upon this
clause, and am satisfied that it is impracticable to lay down a general
rule which will serve as an accurate guide for future cases. It is
safer for courts to pass upon the question as each case is presented.
To invent a rule for determining what the 'same transaction' means,
and when a cause of action shall be deemed to 'arise out' of it, and
what the 'same subject of action' means, and when transactions are to
be deemed connected with it, has taxed the ingenuity of many learned
judges, and I do not deem it necessary to make the effort to find a
solution to these questions." 28 The policy of these judges has been
followed in New York and some of the other code states and each
case determined as it presented itself. The result is very depressing
when such venerable courts are seen to draw hair-line distinctions
27
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throwing out what appeared an inevitable breach from ancient tradition to return once more to the narrowness, that seems to be especially
characterized in the New York courts, which is nothing more than an
heirloom of the former common law system. Such a policy has proved
distasteful to the sense of justice of many jurists in states which have
adopted codes modeled after that of New York and the problem has
been directly confronted and very ably handled with a recognition of
a new era in which the importance of facts has been substituted for
skillfulness in selecting writs or forms of action. Two decisions are
outstanding, viz., McArthur v. Moffett 29 and Searborough v. Smith.30
Considering the former, we find Chief Justice Winslow, after reviewing
the three attenipts of Mr. Pomeroy to define the term in his work on
Code Remedies,31 arriving at this conclusion: "If some essential basic
element can be found which inheres in all causes of action, local as
well as transitory, real as well as personal, which, in actions involving
specific property, can be joined with the specific property, both together forming the subject, and which in the other actions can stand
alone or in connection with the intangible thing involved, like the
character in slander, and form the subject, it would seem that this
might be said to solve the problem ....
"It seems to us that this basic and fundamental element is to
be found in the plaintiff's main primary right, for the invasion of
which the action is brought. Thus in controversies involving conflicting claims for the specific real or personal property the property itself
plus the right, title, interest, claim or lien upon that property which
the plaintiff alleges and which gives him his standing in the court is
to be considered as together forming the subject of action." 32 Now
let us look to the latter case in which the plaintiff asserts three causes
of action: (1) Ejectment; (2) Rents and profits; and (3) For partition, involving certain real estate. We quote from Justice Valentine's
opinion as follows: "These three causes of action are in fact all
founded upon, or, in other words, 'arise out of,' three classes of infringements upon one single right of the plaintiff .

. .

. Said single

right of the plaintiff in this action, consists in his right to use and enjoy, in the manner he chooses, 'his said interest in said real property,
with all the, proceeds and avails thereof. This right is the 'subject or
action' in this case. It is the basis and foundation of the whole
action.....

it does not include the several 'transactions' 'connected.

with' it, and out of which the several causes of action arise; for the
'subject of action' (the 'same' subject of action) must be common to
29 Op. cit. supra note
30 Op. cit. supra note
81 POwzRiOY, op. cit.
32 Op. cit. supra note
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all the several causes of action which are united, while the several
'transactions' cannot be thus common. Each transaction or class of
transactions must ordinarily belong to a different cause of action;
and of course, tHle 'subject of action' is not the 'cause of action' or
the cause of any action, or any cause of action." 83 From the Supreme
Court of Connecticut we have the following adjudication: "Several
causes of action may be stated in a single count, when such causes
of action are not separate and distinct from each other; that is, separable from each other 'by some distinct line of demarcation.'" 84
This was an action for personal injury and breach of contract and the
two were held joinable as transactions connected with the same subject
of action. Let us now look to the interpretation of this term as applied in the state of New York and note the characteristic of narrowness previously referred to. In the case of Ador v. Blau3 5 in which
the plaintiff seeks to recover in a single action for the negligent acts
of two defendants, one for the wrongful maintenance of an iron fence
upon which the plaintiff's son sustained injuries that resulted in death,
and the other for the negligence of the other defendant, an attending
doctor, in his treatment of the deceased, the court said: "The 'subject
of action' in this action is the negligent act resulting in injury causing
the death of the intestate.... But, of course, the two causes of action
were not connected with the same subject of action, for we again
come back to the different negligent acts alleged in the two causes of
action. In the one case the subject of action is the wrongful act of the
defendant in maintaining a fence, and in the other cause of action it
is the wrongful act of the defendant in negligently treating the intestate. The two causes of action, each against a different defendant, do
not arise out of a transaction, connected with the same subject of
action."(Italics suptoied.) There is a dissenting opini6n to this conclusion by Judge Cordozo to this effect: "...
each of the defendants
has thus contributed to a single casualty, which is the subject of
action, i. e., the death of the child, to the pecuniary damage of the
parents, that a death so occasioned supplies a unifying center which
'connects' the subject of action in one count with the subject of action
in the other . . ." 36 From his comments upon this case, we find
Mr. Clark in accord with this dissenting view: "The court thinks of
the legal labels to be applied in deciding the case and says, two, one
for the negligence or nuisance of the owner, one for the malpractice of
the physician. Yet the non-legal witnesses are not going to divide up
their testimony along these lines. They are there to tell what they
Op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 406.
Muisenbacker v. Society of Danbury, 42 Ad. 67, 69 (Conn. 1889).
85 148 N. E. 771, 775 (N. 7. 1925).
86 Op. cit. supra note 35.
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know concerning the facts leading to the death of the child. This
is the ground or occasion of the suit, and hence, in the practical and
legal sense, is the cause of action. Since pleading is to give a foretaste of the facts which in turn come from law witnesses, and since it
is the shortening of trials, rather than instruction of the court in the
process of legal labeling which the pleadings are designed to assist,
the latter is the proper content for the phase in this connection." 37
Tnder the circumstances of this case the decision is probably correct
because of the defective pleading on the part of the plaintiff's council,
he having assigned each defendant's wrongful act as the sole cause of
action. But the court adopted reasoning in reaching this decision
that fails to give the code its full import. Their investigation did not
carry the cause of action into the "subject of action," it stopped at
the act which is no more than part of the transaction that gave rise
to the cause of action as a result of the violations of the primary
right in two particular aspects. These last two elements, the primary
right and its particular aspects, constitute the "subject of action."
Let us analyze the facts we have here and see if our contention is not
correct. The primary right involved is personal bodily security, its
particular aspects, among others, include freedom from injury by negligent acts and freedom from injury to a nuisance maintained by
another, all of this is the subject of action, by virtue of which, as
between the two defendants and the deceased, there were rights and
corresponding duties; next there occurred two series of facts relative to
these rights and duties by which the legal relations of the parties
were altered and which culminated in malpractice in one instance, and
maintenance of a nuisance in the other-here were the transactions
and they gave rise to two causes of action for breaches of one defendant's duty not to injure the deceased's person in a negligent way,
malpractice, and of the other defendant's duty not to physically injure
the deceased by maintaining a nuisance. Thus appears the second
clause of the sub-section in its full effect----'causes of action arising
out of transactions connected with the same subject of action." Judge
Cordozo obtains this result but loses sight of the significance of "transactions," and while they played no distinctive part here, in many
cases they will, so should never be lost sight of.
Now that we have investigated all of these disputed terms what
can we say of sub-section 9 of the New York code? The writer submits that an interpretation is possible and that rightly understood
this sub-section gives to an otherwise arbitrarily restricted power of
joinder of causes of action that extension which carries out the purpose
of the code; the breaking away from prior common law restrictions
and centralizing law and equity into a single channel of jurisdiction,-37
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the civil action. Considering the first clause of the sub-section, "claims
(causes of action) arising out of the same transaction." We conclude
from the foregoing treatment of the term "claims" or "cause of
action" that there is a right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty upon
the defendant, and that a breach of this duty has occurred. Now all
:f this arises out of a "transaction" so before the full import can be
disclosed we have to construe this term. Our previous treatment of
"transaction" brought to light these common elements running through
the definitions: it does or may give rise to a cause of action, it is an
occurrence between the parties. Now just what do we mean by that
which will give rise to a cause of action and is an occurrence? As we
have seen where two parties are in any way concerned one with the
other, rights and corresponding duties spring up and are "labeled,"
to borrow Mr. Clark's term, according to the specific aspect of the
primary right that they involve, now the mere existence of the right
and duty between these two, or more, parties alters their legal relationship, a "transaction" alters the legal relationship as we have seen;
thlen we inquire, what meanings have these rights and duties, what
is their significance, how are they handled or treated? They are
recognized as "facts"; further we know that a "transaction" does or
may give rise to a cause of action. To have a cause of action there
must be a breach of duty by the defendant, and how will this be
established? It must rest upon "facts" and be a "fact" itself. So
we may say that these "occurrences" between the parties are the
"facts" that alter the legal relations of one party in respect to the
other, and if these facts are sufficient to amount to a breach of the
defendant's duty owed to the plaintiff, then there is a cause of action.
In conclusion, then, we may say that a "transaction ' is a cumulative term denoting all those facts bearing on the legal relations of
the parties in connection with the particular aspect of the primary
right that their conduct involves. Now our first clause declares that
when these facts constituting the transaction are so conducted as to
result in two or more violations of the defendant's duty owed the
plaintiff the causes of action arising therefrom may be joined in the
same complaint or petition.
Before we determine the meaning of the second clause we must
crystalize "subject of action." From our previous treatment we find
"subject of action" involves two elements, the primary right in the
plaintiff and the particular aspect of that primary right, or the subprimary right, which has acquired a corresponding duty from the defendant. Now we may consider this clause "transactions connected
with the same subject of action" and it must be thus interpreted:
The primary right and the particular aspect thereof involved plus all
those facts altering the relationship of the parties in respect to the
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sub-primary right (the particular aspect) and the corresponding duty,
and as the clause uses the plural, "transactions," there must be two
or more such particular aspects of the primary right with which are
connected, severally, these surrounding facts. In its entirety this clausb
should read: "Causes of action arising out of transactions connected
with the same subject of action" for without the introduction given
here' no causes of action would necessarily arise and there would be
nothing to join in the complaint or petition.
A lengthy and intensive discussion of the other sub-sections of the
sample code employed in this article is hardly necessary as they specifically set out iheir limits. In general it can be said of all of them
that when two or more causes of action arising in their specific fields
between the same parties ind otherwise comply with the final section
of the code, which will be next considered, whether they be legal or
equitable or both, they may be joined in the same complaint. Of
these the first, "Upon contract, express or implied," is by far the
broadest and is the only one that need be individually considered, for
as to the others there is no question of boundaries, they are specifically
stated in the provision itself. In treating the first sub-section, Mr.
Clark observes: "This class has been given a consistently broad interpretation, as including all manner of claims considered at common
law in the contract actions. Thus causes arising upon covenants, upon
debts of record or of contract, or of law, and upon express, implied,
and quasi contracts, including waiver of tort, may all be joined indiscriminately." 38

These arbitrarily "chosen few" sub-sections seem to have been
selected and arranged according to their subject-matter and it is soniewhat strange that having grouped all contract claims within one division that such fundamental classification should not have been applied
to the other divisions of the law, but the legislature did not deem this
advisable from all that appears, no doubt because of the old common
law influence, and so started the new code, and the freedom it seemed
to offer, on its career after encumbering it with serious burdens, some
of which still remain.
The final section of the code reads: "But it must appear, upon the
face of the complaint, that all the causes of action, so united, belong
to one of the foregoing sub-divisions of this section; that they are
consistent with each other; and, except as otherwise prescribed by law,
that they affect all the parties to the action: and it must appear upon
the face of the complaint, that they do not require different places of
trial." The only troublesome parts of this section are the meanings
of "that they are consistent with each other," '"must not require
38
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different places of trial," and "that they affect all the parties to the
action." We will take them in order.
"That they are consistent with each other." Some dispute arose
over what had to be consistent, facts or claims. In New York the
latter element is deemed the key, whether or not the causes of action
arose out of the same sub-division is not the ultimate question then,
if they do they must still be consistent with each other, in other words
a claim in contract could not be joined with a claim in tort, despite
the fact that the facts that brought about the causes of action arose
out of the same transaction. In the majority of the states whose codes
include this section, and it might be well to add that it is found only in
arose out of the same sub-division is not the ultimate question then,
a few, thirty-five, and read in by a few courts where it is not included in
the code, the courts only require that there be a consistency of the facts
alleged, and this seems far more just, and as a matter of fact is always
true if section 9 is involved. Mr. Clark's remarks upon the consistency
of facts are interesting: "It then becomes a requirement of truth in
the pleadings, and where it appears that proof of all the facts alleged
means perjury by somebody the pleadings are objectionable. This gives
a limited but practical application of the provision. It should be
omitted, however, for the chance of misconception which it gives, and
since all its usefulness is covered by the general requirement that
pleadings must be true." 39
"Must not require different places of trial." Thus joinder of causes
of action must depend upon whether the court has jurisdiction over the
res in some instances and'over the parties in other. It is a question
of "local" and "transitory" actions and of course must be adhered to.
It is obvious from this provision that the codes have not affected the
venue rules of the common law.
"That they affect all the partes to the acton." It was formerly
held that all the parties had to be affected equally but this strict rule
has been broken away from and now, while the effect may be unequal
it must be in the same capacity. So one could not sue as real party
in interest when he is a "next friend," nor could a cause affecting one
as individual be joined with another affecting him as administrator.
This has a material effect upon joinder of causes of action. Mr. Clark's
opinion is adverse to this requirement: "It amounts to another limitation on joinder of parties and would seem undesirable, for the party
joinder rule should be a single one complete in itself. Several codes
provide that it shall not apply to a mortgage foreclosure action, and
the New York Civil Practice Act, in adopting the English rule of party
joinder did go at least to the0 extent of omitting this provision from the
joinder of causes section." 4
39
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NOTES
In the research connected with this article the writer was somewhat
forceably impressed with the universality of the expression that the
shackles preventing the widespread joinder that the code section,
apart from its restrictions, are appendages of common law heredity,
that the experience of the legislators and jurists at the time the code
was first enacted was so fundamentally common law they were unable
to set it aside and endow their reform movement with the freedom it
would logically demand. The writer has observed that as the newer
states in the western part of our country adopted the code and began
to interpret it the broader privileges thereunder began to grow. This
fact seems to bear out the truth of common law influence upon early
decisions involving the code provisions, for it was the absence of this
influence that enabled these newer judicial bodies to see the full import
of the provisions and give them that effect. This traditional element
accompanied with the characteristic reticent attitude of the bar toward
a change in that with which it is familiar, accounts for the failure
of the code to attain its fullest effect even though it has been constantly litigated for more than seventy-five years. Deeper impressions
are constantly being made, however, and very probably it is only a
question of time before the remaining impediments are left by the
wayside and the era the codes sought to attain rises to its full import.
Edward L. Barrett.
(With sincerest appreciations to Mr. F. W. Brown.)

ARE You A CRIMINAL?*-Criminal Law is interesting to everyone.
In the first instance, it involves the frailties and imperfections of the
human race, and in the second place every day that you read a newspaper you are getting.a miniature legal education along the line of

criminal law. In your daily discourse you very probably use the
word "crime" because crime is and has been for centuries a much discussed phase of our lives. In fact, there has been so much discussion
of crime in recent years that perhaps you have wondered on occasions

whether or not you are a criminal, intentionally or otherwise. The
answer, of course, depends on whether or not you have ever committed
a crime, but this answer is not very enlightening unless you know -what

is meant by the word "crime." If I were to ask you to define the
word "crime" I would probably receive as large a variety of definitions
as Mr. Heinz has food products. However, instead of asking you to
define what is meant by "crime" I am going to analyze the word for
you and point out the various elements of a crime, hoping thereby to
*This address was broadcast over radio station WGN on Sept. 24, 1931, by Professor William M. James of the Chicago Kent College of Law.
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give you a keener appreciation of the enormous amount of study which
has been devoted by jurists, lawyers and laymen to the elements involved in crime; also answer the question as to whether or not you are
a criminal and incidentally enable you to better understand some of
our judicial decisions.
One of the most satisfactory definitions of the word "crime" is as
follows: A crime is a wilful act or omission for which the law prescribes a penalty enforced by the State in its own name, the act or
omission being by a person who is criminally responsible and who has,
in doing an act, or omitting the duty, a criminal intent.
An analysis of this definition discloses first of all that a crime involves a wilful act or omission to act. By wilful, however, is meant
voluntary, or to put it in another way, merely the free exercise of one's
conscious volition. A rather homely example is found in the case of
where one person seizes the hand of another in which is a weapon and
in spite of resistance kills a third person with it. The act not being
the voluntary act of the person who had the weapon, he would not be
guilty of a crime, but the act being the voluntary act of the person
who seized the innocent participant's hand would render the assailant
guilty of murder if the other elements of the crime of murder were
present. Even this requirement of foluntariness, however, is subject,
of course, to the well recognized exception that one cannot take the
life of an innocent person to save his own life.
Delving further into our definition, we find the words "act or omission." Act is here used in the sense of doing or saying something
which does or might produce an effect on a person or thing. That
-is to say, it means more than a mere purpose or intent which finds no
expression for mere purpose or intent which finds no expression can
never constitute a crime against human law. To illustrate you might
say to yourself "that neighbor of mine exasperates me and I would
like to give him a first class licking." Thus far you have committed
no crime, but if you should permit yourself the indulgence of carrying
your thought into execution you would be guilty of assault and battery.
On the other hand, an omission to act may result in criminal responsibility. Thus neglecting to provide food or medicine for one who is
helpless by one whose duty it is to so provide may render the omitting
party criminally responsible, or the negligent omission of a switchman
to close a switch may render the switchman criminally responsible if
death results from the omission to act.
Pursuing our definition further, we notice it contains the phrase "A
wilful act or omission for which the law prescribes a penalty enforced
by the state in its own name." A crime then contemplates the inflic-
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tion of a penalty. This penalty may result from a law adopted by
the Congress of the United States, the Legislatures of the several states
or by the common law, but regardless of the source of the penalty, in
order to render the act or omission a crime, the law must affix a vindictive punishment to it.
Inasmuch as a crime is punished for the protection of society at
large and not merely because of an injury to the individual, it is
contemplated that the punishment therefor shall be brought about by
the Sovereign, hence it is that in Illinois, for example, a criminal case
is entitled: "People of the State of Illinois vs. John Doe" or whatever
the defendant's name may be.
We come now to a very interesting and important element in our
definition, namely "the act or omission must be by a person who is
criminally responsible and who has in doing the act or omitting the
duty a criminal intent." It is extremely difficult to explain what is
meant by a "criminal intent." It is not to be confused with "motive"
or "purpose" for with the best motives in the world one may commit
a criminal act with a criminal intent and yet be innocent of any purpose to do wrong or violate the law. This is well illustrated by the
celebrated case of a certain unduly enthusiastic lady who, prior to the
day of Woman's suffrage, cast her vote at an election for the sole and
only purpose of testing the law hoping thereby that the Supreme Court
would construe the law to mean that women as well as men could vote.
She obviously had no intention of being a criminal or of doing a
wrongful act. However, the court held that the reason why she did
the act was merely her motive that the law prohibited her from voting;
that she had voted contrary to law and therefore had a criminal intent.
Generally speaking, it may be said that by criminal intent is meant, the
intention to do a wrongful act or an act prohibited by law, or the negligent doing of an act, or indifference to duty or to consequences so that
the participant is regarded by his conduct to have had a criminal intent
This doctrine that one must have a criminal intent is subject to the
well recognized exception that the legislature in adopting a statute may
make an act a crime without a criminal intent being present in the
mind of the violator. Familiar types of this class of legislation are
some pure food and drug acts, narcotic laws, bigamy laws and laws
prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to minors. However, as a general
rule, a criminal intent must be present and therein lies the reason why
insanity, or drunkenness in certain cases only, or infancy and sometimes marriage, .insofar as the wife's criminal responsibility is concerned, will often excuse one from punishment.
Take for instance, the case of a six year old child. The law presumes that he is incapable of a criminal intent, and as a consequence if

